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In a recent case, Tortorice v. Tortrice,223 before either the
120 day period had expired or conciliation proceedings had terminated, 224 defendant wife moved to dismiss a divorce "action,"
under CPLR 3211 225 as insufficient.
The court reasoned that "[t]he entire spirit of Article 11-B
of the Domestic Relations Law is slanted toward a resolution
of matrimonial difficulties by the Conciliation Bureau, uncluttered
by pleadings and differences regarding the merits of the controversy." 226 Although the court admitted that it was inclined to
the defendant's view that if there were a complaint before it, it
would be demurrable for insufficiency, the motion was nevertheless
denied as premature.
DRL § 211; § 232:

Questions as to service of complaint answered.

Two questions posed by the new Domestic Relations Law have
recently been answered. When can a complaint in a separation
action be served? In Cohen v. Cohen,227 the court examined
section 211 of the Domestic Relations Law which provides:
An action for divorce or. separation shall be commenced by the service
of a summons. A verified complaint in such action may not be
served until the expiration of one hundred twenty days from the date
of service of the summons or the expiration of conciliation proceedings
under article eleven-B of this chapter, whichever period is less.
In spite of the provisions of this section, the court held that a
complaint served with the summons was not served prematurely
and denied a motion to dismiss. This decision, which is contrary
to several other supreme court cases, 228 was based upon the inconsistency between sections 211 and 2 15-a. Although the 1966
Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and
Family Laws had recommended conciliative proceedings in both
separation and divorce actions,2 29 section 215-a empowered the
Conciliation Bureau solely for divorce cases. On the other hand,
section 211 contains the same "cooling-off" period for divorce
Misc. 2d 649, 286 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
a brief survey of the new "cooling-off" and conciliation provisions
of the Domestic Relations Law see The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 615, 634 (1968).
225 It is unclear what ground was urged for dismissal as defendant failed
22355
224For

to specify, as required under 3211(e).

Misc. 2d at 650, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
Misc. 2d 721, 286 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
225 Beanland v. Beanland, 54 Misc. 2d 1010, 283 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup Ct.
22655
22755

Kings County 1967); Crocker v. Crocker, 54 Misc. 2d 738, 283 N.Y.S.2d
362 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
229 REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

and separation proceedings. The court, emphasizing the provisions
of 215-a, felt that the legislative intent was not to have a "coolingoff" period in separation cases.
The conflict between Cohen and other lower court cases has
now become academic. Sections 211 and 215-a of the Domestic
Relations Law have recently been amended to include all matrimonial actions
except an action to declare the nullity of a void
230
marriage.
Effective September 1, 1968, a complaint in a separation,
divorce, or annulment action may not be served until the expiration of 120 days from the date of service of the summons or the
expiration of conciliation proceedings, whichever period is less.
If the complaint in a separation action is in violation of section
2
211, will the summons also be dismissed? In Apploff v. Apploff, 31
a complaint in violation of section 211 was dismissed. The summons, however, defective because it did not bear the endorsement
notifying the defendant of the nature of the action as required
by section 232 232 was not dismissed. The court, on its own
motion, in light of the fact that defendant had notice of the
nature of the action and was represented by counsel, deemed the
summons amended nunc pro tun to the caption "Action for a
Separation." The court's action here was certainly in conformity
with modern practice; since the defendant had notice, nothing would
have been accomplished by dismissing the summons.
GENERAL MUNIcIPAL LAw

GML § 50-e: CPLR 2004 applied.
General Municipal Law section 50-e requires a 90 day notice
of claim before a suit may be commenced against a municipality.
Extensions may be granted in a limited number of cases, for
example, infant claims, deaths, or prejudicial reliance upon settlement representations.
Courts have been extremely rigorous233 in
enforcing the 90 day limit and have allowed few extensions.
230
Laws of 1968, ch. 701 amending section 211; Laws of 1968, ch. 706
amending 215-a.
231 55 Misc. 2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
232 DRL Section 232 states, inter alia: "In an action to annul a marriage
or for divorce or for separation, if the complaint is not personally served
with the summons, the summons shall have legibly written or printed upon
the face thereof: 'Action to annul a marriage', 'Action to declare the nullity
of a void marriage', 'Action for a divorce', or 'Action for a separation', as
the case may be. A judgment shall not be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff upon the defendant's default in appearing or pleading, unless either
the summons and a copy of the complaint were personally delivered to the
defendant, or the copy of the summons delivered to the defendant, upon
personal service of the summons, or delivered to him without the state, or
published, pursuant to an order for that purpose, containing such notice."
233 E.g., Jefferson v. New York City Housing Authority, 24 App. Div. 2d
943, 265 N.Y.S.2d 336 (lst Dep't 1965); Payne v. Village of Horseheads,

